It’s easier to criticize than to govern. This lesson applies to military adventurers all over the world. New Age’s Editorial today is worth highlighting, although the question remains as to where we would be today had the army not stepped in. Gotta love those counterfactuals!

If we were an ethnically defined society would we be in the grips of a civil war without army intervention (look at Kenya)?  Would we have faced a civil war regardless (Colombia in the 1950s)?  Are army takeovers a necessary evil in countries like Thailand and Bangladesh? Military coups are certainly better than full blown civil wars but is it an either-or choice that we faced in 1/11? What could the army have done short of taking over the reigns of power and disrupting democracy? Is it a good idea to have the army waiting in the wings as some sort of an overseer of national destiny (Greece, Turkey). How can we fix our political parties so that they know when to bow out in the interest of the greater good (like Al Gore in 2001)?

Lessons to learn from Thai army’s admitted misadventure

It is hardly surprising that the military council, which ousted former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 in a coup, accusing him of corruption and irreverence towards the Thai monarchy, and governed the country for the past two years, has proved entirely inept at running state affairs. So much so, in fact, that the council has promised that ‘there will be no more coups,’ as a Thaksin-backed political party prepares to assume office after the country’s recent elections, according to a report published in New Age on Wednesday. What is surprising, however, is that the Thai military has acquired the wisdom to recognise that ‘the military should not be involved in politics’ as the council’s spokesperson told reporters on Tuesday.
   The Council for National Security has been widely derided in Thailand over the past two years for its inability to handle the country’s economic and social issues. Even though the council accused Thaksin of rampant corruption, they have so far only been able to prove one of the cases against him in court, and have had his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) political party’s senior leadership disbanded and banned from political activity for five years. Thaksin himself is living in exile, facing imprisonment if he returns to Thailand, but this has not decimated his popularity in predominantly rural Thailand. Thaksin supporters and activists joined the almost defunct PPP en masse and, on a pro-Thaksin platform, have fallen just short of gaining an overall parliamentary majority in the recent elections. While Thaksin’s regime is widely accused of corruption, his tenure as prime minister also saw unprecedented economic prosperity in rural Thailand.
   There are important lessons to be learnt from these international experiences with military interventions into the polity, especially in South Asia, and specifically in Bangladesh. The concept of political and socio-economic reforms imposed in a top-down method, while undoubtedly tempting, is also heavily weighed down by historical proof of its utter lack of success. In Nepal, the frustration and animosity that ordinary Nepalis felt towards corrupt political parties ultimately led to their popular support for a state of emergency which made way for King Gyanendra’s dictatorial rule in 2005. That violent and autocratic regime ultimately had to be toppled by a popular uprising in the spring of 2006. In Pakistan, popular support for General Musharraf’s 1999 coup has not only led to his destructive and polarising autocracy, it has paved the way for the largest contingent of radical Islamist parties in the Pakistani parliament. As lessons may be learnt from the processes through which such top-down reforms are instituted, so lessons should be learnt from the outcomes of such attempts.